Good post, as always. One thing left unanswered: what are the prospects for a Bancor-like global reserve currency system? Could recent events make it so India, Russia, China etc press for something like what Keynes proposed at Bretton Woods?
I think that's highly unlikely. For anything to unseat the dollar it would have to come with a ton of backing outside the US, which in practice means the national currency of another major power. Having a supranational body dictate any degree of monetary policy is really difficult (the Eurozone is extremely integrated and still a massive headache), and India/China disagree too much to accept ceding control to a unified international body like that.
Very convincing and clear position on a captivating but not so easy to catch topic (at least for an amateur). I read this blog for the first time, following a link in Adam Tooze’s Chartbook, and I think I will come back for other posts !
Beyond the big question of the statute of reserve currency change, could be a realistic pathway that the Sino Russian trade moves from the “88% of Russian exports to China [were] priced in dollars or euros” to trade flows mainly on an renminbi basis, especially as they are relatively complementary trade flows (commodities vs. manufactured products) ? Eventually, could an Eurasian trade area outside Dollar/Euro influence develop in such a way (the economic reflection of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation) with some level of isolation from the global system ?
Of course, it would to some extent epitomize and foster a vassalization of Russia to China, but could it be a first realistic step (well ahead of shaking the dollar leadership) ?
Excellent article. It just shows how complex the issue is beneath the surface. I think Bill Gates said something along the lines: people overestimate what’s possible in a year and underestimate what’s possible over 5 years. It’s all about timeframes, and we need to be thinking in decades.
China's desire for stability and control makes bitcoin a nonstarter, and their desire to manage their currency valuation means keeping a good amount of reserves on hand is necessary. The more likely response will simply be continued movement towards more technological and production self-sufficiency from China, which have been ongoing since the start of the trade war.
But also Taiwan isn't Ukraine and China isn't Russia. An invasion of Taiwan would be more difficult and justify a larger military response.
The "crumbling" of the "dollar order" periodically surfaces. From 1995: "If the administration does not change its laissez-faire dollar policy and cut the budget deficit, boost savings, and take a hard line on trade, the 50th anniversary of V-J Day will signify its collapse."
Useful article on sanctions and their ramifications on givers and takers and neutral s in between.
Thank you!
Good post, as always. One thing left unanswered: what are the prospects for a Bancor-like global reserve currency system? Could recent events make it so India, Russia, China etc press for something like what Keynes proposed at Bretton Woods?
I think that's highly unlikely. For anything to unseat the dollar it would have to come with a ton of backing outside the US, which in practice means the national currency of another major power. Having a supranational body dictate any degree of monetary policy is really difficult (the Eurozone is extremely integrated and still a massive headache), and India/China disagree too much to accept ceding control to a unified international body like that.
Lol ..
Lol ..
Very convincing and clear position on a captivating but not so easy to catch topic (at least for an amateur). I read this blog for the first time, following a link in Adam Tooze’s Chartbook, and I think I will come back for other posts !
Beyond the big question of the statute of reserve currency change, could be a realistic pathway that the Sino Russian trade moves from the “88% of Russian exports to China [were] priced in dollars or euros” to trade flows mainly on an renminbi basis, especially as they are relatively complementary trade flows (commodities vs. manufactured products) ? Eventually, could an Eurasian trade area outside Dollar/Euro influence develop in such a way (the economic reflection of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation) with some level of isolation from the global system ?
Of course, it would to some extent epitomize and foster a vassalization of Russia to China, but could it be a first realistic step (well ahead of shaking the dollar leadership) ?
Excellent article. It just shows how complex the issue is beneath the surface. I think Bill Gates said something along the lines: people overestimate what’s possible in a year and underestimate what’s possible over 5 years. It’s all about timeframes, and we need to be thinking in decades.
What about a less extreme scenario where China moves out of UST and into gold and BTC over ten years as a hedge against wanting to take over Taiwan
China's desire for stability and control makes bitcoin a nonstarter, and their desire to manage their currency valuation means keeping a good amount of reserves on hand is necessary. The more likely response will simply be continued movement towards more technological and production self-sufficiency from China, which have been ongoing since the start of the trade war.
But also Taiwan isn't Ukraine and China isn't Russia. An invasion of Taiwan would be more difficult and justify a larger military response.
thanks makes sense !
The "crumbling" of the "dollar order" periodically surfaces. From 1995: "If the administration does not change its laissez-faire dollar policy and cut the budget deficit, boost savings, and take a hard line on trade, the 50th anniversary of V-J Day will signify its collapse."
https://thefaintofheart.wordpress.com/2011/08/07/the-myth-of-the-strong-dollar/